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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to determine the nature of any relationship between renewable energy 
investment, oil prices, GDP and the interest rate, using a time series approach. We concentrate 
on three countries with different relationships with the renewable energy sector, with Norway 
and the UK being oil-exporters for most of the sample and the USA an importer. Following 
estimation using a VAR model, the results provide evidence of considerable heterogeneity 
across the countries, with the USA and Norway having a strong relationship between oil prices 
and renewable energy and the UK no relationship. These results reflect the fact that the USA is 
predominantly an oil-importer during most of this sample and supports renewable energy 
relatively less than the other countries, so changes to renewable energy investment reflect other 
factors in the market such as the price of substitutes to a greater extent than countries where 
renewable energy receives more government support. Similarly with Norway, where due to its 
market orientated approach, there is some evidence of the macroeconomy affecting the 
renewable energy market. The main policy implications from this study are that in countries 
where there is little support for the renewable energy sector, investment will be more dependent 
on macroeconomic aspects as well as substitutes such as oil, therefore the authorities will need 
to potentially increase financial support when oil prices are low or when the economy is in a 
downturn to ensure investment in RE continues at a constant level. 
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1. Introduction 
  As concerns for the international environment grow, the international community needs 
to increase investment into the renewable energy (RE) sector by approximately $130bn over 
the next fifteen years. This is to ensure that carbon dioxide emissions peak in 2020 and global 
warming remains below 2°C (See IEA, 2015[1]), which is the generally accepted figure that, if 
broken, would push global warming to beyond acceptable limits. This means that investment 
into RE needs to increase rapidly, but it is less clear what will facilitate this increase in RE 
investment. The main factor considered here relates to whether the oil prices significantly affect 
the investment in and production of RE. The price of oil has recently fallen by over 60%, from 
highs of $107 in June 2014 to $40 in November 2015. This has created substantial debate on 
the potential effects it will have on investment in RE. Clearly, there is no consensus on the 
effects that oil prices have on renewable investment, as it depends on the extent to which oil 
price changes encourage investment in RE, so if the oil price increases from its current lows, as 
many analysts are predicting, what, if any, will be the impact of this rise be on RE  investment. 
  Following recent international agreements over the need to reduce greenhouse gases, 
such as the G8 statement that it aims to cut emissions by 50% before 2050, the means of 
achieving these cuts is becoming ever more important. One of the most commonly used policies 
has involved the use of RE production as a substitute for fossil fuels. As international and 
European Union (EU) targets for reducing carbon dioxide emissions have become more 
important, so governments across the world have sought to expand the production of energy 
from RE sources through the use mainly of subsidies and indirectly through additional taxation 
on fossil fuels. As a result, government intervention in the RE market has been the dominant 
factor in determining RE investment over the majority of the analysis period. Because 
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government intervention in this market is declining, due to the increasing competitiveness of 
RE technologies, and the degree of substitution between RE and oil is increasing, the 
conclusions from this study suggest that the relationship between RE and its substitutes will 
become more significant and robust in some countries.  
 There are six main original contributions of this paper to the analysis of the RE sector 
and which seek to fill a gap in the literature on RE policies and the development of future RE 
resources. Firstly, we introduce a methodology and modelling framework which captures (a) 
the individual contrasting characteristics of three distinct markets for RE by using time series 
data, (b) the interaction between oil prices and RE in a time series framework including for the 
first time generalised impulse response functions as well as the more conventional Granger-
causality tests and (c) the dynamic nature of this interaction in the context of the main 
macroeconomic variables including national output and interest rates. Furthermore the results 
provide evidence that (d) testing for the relationship in both the long and short run suggests a 
short but not a long-run relationship, (e) using nominal and real oil prices indicates that the 
results are robust to either measure of oil prices. Whilst (f) analysing the impact of national 
policies on the RE markets with respect to the relationship between oil prices and RE markets 
provides evidence of substantial differences across these countries depending on whether they 
are exporters or importers of oil and also levels of support for the RE sector. Overall our aim is 
to demonstrate that the relationship between oil prices and renewable energy needs to be 
explicitly analysed on a country by country basis, due to the inherent heterogeneities within 
countries in terms of RE policies and natural resources, as already acknowledged in this 
literature. Specifically we have used annual time-series data for Norway, the UK and the USA 
from 1960 to 2015 and a number of techniques that haven’t been applied to this area of the 
literature before.  
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Most of the literature relating RE to oil prices and the macroeconomy, has focused on 
how government policy can be used to encourage RE investment, since historically RE 
investment has not been able to compete openly with traditional fossil fuels in terms of cost, 
except in Norway. [2] has examined this relationship and the effect that reducing renewable 
costs may have, although, they noted how hard it is to generalise the costs of RE, since it varies 
from location to location, and will include either costs or savings not usually experienced by 
traditional energy production, such as the increased costs from storing electricity, to the fact 
that solar energy is often installed at the point of the electricity use, so offsetting transportation 
and infrastructure costs. A common theme across this area of literature is that a major factor 
preventing investment into RE is the uncertainty over the future returns it will provide.  
Whilst there is a shortage of studies linking investment in RE to oil prices using time 
series approaches and data, the most closely related study is by [3], but unlike this study used a 
panel model of RE consumption and included GDP as well as oil prices. In general, the previous 
literature has concentrated on RE consumption and panel data models due to the availability of 
suitable data. [3]  found that real per capita GDP and per capita CO2 emissions were the main 
long-term drivers of consumption of RE, whilst changes in oil prices had a weak negative 
relationship. Using G7 data, they found heterogeneity across the countries studied, with 
movements back towards equilibrium following a shock taking between a year and seven years. 
There is a large body of literature analysing the specific relationship  between RE consumption 
and GDP growth (see [4]) which is indirectly relevant to this study, including [5], [6] and [7] 
who also use a panel data model along with cointegration and Granger causality tests to analyse 
the relationship between RE consumption, GDP, investment and the labour force. They find 
evidence of a long-run equilibrium and bi-directional Granger causality between RE 
consumption and GDP growth in OECD Countries, Eurasia and Central America. In a relate 
area of the literature, [8] showed that there existed a relationship between the stock prices of 
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clean-energy stocks and oil prices, with movements in oil prices Granger causing the stock 
prices of the clean energy companies, which were also affected by movements in technology 
stocks and the interest rate. A further area in the literature analyses the relationship between RE 
and non-renewable energy markets (NRE), such as [9]. A final area of the relevant literature 
relates to the relationship specifically between oil prices, output and interest rates, such as [10] 
who found that both output and interest rates are significantly affected by oil price shocks.   
Overall there are not many studies concentrating on the specific relationship between 
the RE sector and oil prices, particularly using a time series empirical approach. The study by 
[11] has most in common with this study in terms of methodology although they use more 
financial based measures rather than the economic measures used here. They apply a VAR 
model to primarily investigate the relationship between the stock prices of RE firms, oil prices 
and technology stock prices. They find that oil prices and technology stock prices can affect RE 
stock prices. A further set of studies have analysed the ability of various models to forecast the 
diffusion of RE provision. There are a number of approaches used, such as [12], who use an 
extended logistic growth model to predict the diffusion of RE in South Korea based on oil prices 
and policy instruments. Their results suggest that higher oil prices have led to an increase in 
diffusion rates of RE resources in the electrical power sector. In addition, a further area of the 
literature analyses the policy and market impacts on the RE market. This includes [13] who 
develop a model that accounts for the fact that larger companies can have a significant impact 
on prices in the RE market and find that environmental uncertainties need to be modelled 
explicitly. Table 1 provides a review of the most relevant studies, which contain measures of 
RE, NRE (including oil prices), and GDP as well as other macroeconomic variables. Although 
most compare the causal relationship between RE and GDP and NRE and GDP separately, 
other studies have analysed the causal relationship between all the variables. Although the 
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results tend to be mixed, many find like this study that the results are heterogeneous across 
countries, hence the need to analyse the relationship on a country by country basis. 
Table 1. Review of the recent literature. 
Study Methodology Time period Countries Results 
Sadorsky [3] 
 
Payne [14] 
 
 
Bowden and Payne 
[15] 
 
Menegaki [16] 
 
 
Tiwari [17] 
 
Apergis and Payne 
[18] 
Apergis and Payne 
[19] 
 
Apergis and Payne 
[9] 
Tugcu et al [20] 
 
Dogan [21] 
 
 
Panel cointegration 
 
Toda-Yamamota 
Causality 
 
Toda-Yamamoto 
causality 
 
Random effects panel 
model 
 
PVAR Model 
 
Panel cointegration and 
Error Correction Models 
Non-linear smooth 
transition panel vector 
ECM 
Panel cointegration and 
ECM 
Mulitvariate panel 
approach 
Cointegration and 
causality 
 
1994-2003 
 
1949-2006 
 
 
1949-2006 
 
 
1997-2007 
 
 
1965-2009 
 
1980-2011 
 
1980-2010 
 
 
1990-2007 
 
1980-2009 
 
1988-2012 
 
 
18 emerging 
economies 
US 
 
 
US (sectoral) 
 
 
27 European 
nations 
 
European and 
Eurasian nations 
25 OECD countries 
 
7 Central American 
countries 
 
80 countries 
 
G7 Countries 
 
Turkey 
 
 
Oil prices→ RE 
 
No Causality 
between RE, NRE 
and GDP.  
No causality over 
RE sectors and 
GDP. 
RE but not energy 
cons positively 
affect GDP. 
RE positively 
affects GDP. 
RE ↔ Oil price 
 
Oil price →RE. 
 
 
RE↔NRE 
 
Results vary across 
countries  
No causality 
between RE and 
NRE 
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Bhattacharaya et al. 
[4] 
Panel causality model. 1991-2012 38 countries No causality 
between RE and 
GDP 
Notes: RE is renewable energy, NRE is non-renewable energy, energy cons. is total energy consumption. 
Many of the empirical studies have confirmed that increasing oil prices should stimulate 
greater demand and supply of RE however this paper investigates the sensitivity of RE 
investment to changes in oil prices, GDP and the interest rate ([22, 23]).  Finally, we would 
expect the three countries analysed to respond in different ways to an oil price shock, from the 
perspective of RE investment and related policies. This will enable us to determine if the 
investment of RE is market determined such that it moves in the same direction to oil prices, or 
is being stimulated by the use of policies which aim to encourage increased production of 
energy from renewable resources. Policy makers explicitly need to understand how oil prices 
and macroeconomic variables impact on RE investment. 
Following the introduction, this study analyses the background into RE in the three 
countries investigated, following this we assess the data and results and finally we conclude 
with a discussion of the policy implications of the study. 
2. Country Background and Policies 
  The paper focuses on individual country analysis, as the relationship between RE, oil 
prices and other macrocosmic variables is likely to vary substantially across countries, 
depending on whether the country is a net oil-exporter or importer, its policies towards 
encouraging RE and its overall wealth. Different countries have adopted different policies to 
encouraging increased provision of RE resources, as shown by [24] there are a wide variety of 
different policies available to the authorities to encourage greater use of RE, from fiscal 
incentives to market based financial policies. The countries analysed are Norway, the UK and 
USA as they include predominantly net-exporters and importers of oil and have differing policy 
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approaches regarding subsidies and taxes to the RE sector. Additionally, it includes the USA 
which is the largest economy as well as Norway which is one of the per capita income wealthiest 
economies in the world, whilst the UK has one of the most well established renewable sectors. 
Furthermore, they have a relatively long time series of data due to their interest in RE over a 
prolonged time period. 
2.1. Norway 
Norway is unique in the world in being a major oil-exporter and also an early champion 
of RE. It is also one of the wealthiest countries in the world in terms of per capita GDP. Norway 
is simultaneously the fourteenth largest oil producer and seventh largest RE producer in the 
world (Central Intelligence Agency and Eurostat respectively), for instance over 100% of 
Norway’s electricity requirements are met by RE, so it is able to export electricity as well as 
oil. Norway may therefore already have a hedge against oil price fluctuations. If the oil price 
increases but RE remains constant, then Norway can meet more of its energy obligations using 
RE rather than oil, and vice versa if the oil price decreases. 
Through decades of revenue from oil, Norway has the largest sovereign/pension fund 
in the world (GPFG), and so has a buffer against any short term oil fluctuations, this is of vital 
importance to Norway since oil and gas contributes more than 30% of Norway’s GDP [25]. 
The pension fund means that in an economic downturn resulting from a loss of oil revenue there 
are alternative sources of wealth, rather than debt, although current regulation that the 
government cannot withdraw more than 4% value of the fund per year restricts how effective 
this method can be [26]. Norway has considered using the GPFG as a hedge itself against oil 
price changes through divesting out of fossil fuels, although it is not, for the time being 
however, pursuing this opportunity.  
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Although Norway is a major exporter of RE, domestic RE supply as a percentage of 
total primary energy supply is consistently between 40% and 50%, and the overwhelming 
majority of this comes from hydropower [27]. Norway has the largest share of RE of any IEA 
member country and most of the RE supply has been without substantial subsidies, which is in 
contrast to many other countries, this is almost entirely because of its cost-competitive 
hydroelectric operations [27]. In 2012 Norway and Sweden jointly introduced a green energy 
certificate scheme, which was a market based incentive scheme to encourage more investment 
in RE, however in 2016 Norway left this scheme as it was felt to be undermining the 
hydroelectric producers of electricity.  
Overall therefore, whilst at first glance it may look like the question of ‘How will the 
price of oil affect investment into RE’ is obvious for Norway, with its reliance on oil, it actually 
may be better suited to deal with oil price changes than other countries, so the relationship 
between oil prices and the RE sector may not be as apparent as in other countries.  
2.2. The UK 
Whilst, historically a large net-exporter of oil, since 2005 the UK has been a net-
importer of oil. With the fall in the oil price from highs of $107 in June 2014 to $40 in November 
2015 this has hit North Sea oil production hard, the UK has the highest oil production costs of 
any major oil producing country in the world at about $40 a barrel, compared to the Middle 
East, where oil can be produced for as little as $5 [28]. This change in oil prices has had 
contrasting effects on the UK, North Sea oil production has been hit, but the UK has also had 
an economic upturn from the lower oil import prices.  
The UK has been an advocate of RE production both in the UK and in the wider world, 
between 2010 and 2014 RE sources more than doubled the proportion of electricity they 
provided in the UK, to almost 20%. This RE comes from a variety of sources including wind, 
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hydro and bioenergy. Investment into RE has unsurprisingly mimicked this increase in 
production, also more than doubling between 2010 and 2014 [29]. The UK has also used various 
incentives schemes to encourage the production and use of RE, including subsidies and the 
taxing of NRE sources, although recently the levels of subsidy have been reduced. For instance, 
subsidies for domestic solar power under the Green Deal have been more than halved. The RE 
policies in the UK have proven to be controversial in some ways, for instance [30] have 
suggested that to meet the UK’s RE targets, they will require a large amount of biomass, 
requiring substantial imports to meet these demands. They suggest this could have negative 
environmental externalities in the form of deforestation and food supply. 
2.3. The USA 
The United States’ experience with oil is the reverse of the UK, having been a net-
importer of oil since the 1940s, then in 2013 the USA became a net-exporter of oil again and 
now is the world’s largest producer (not the largest exporter however, due to large domestic 
demand for oil and restrictions on the legality of exporting oil [31]). The reason for this huge 
increase in oil production is in a large part due to fracking, a method of firing a high-pressure 
water mixture at shale rock in order to release gas and oil from the rock, which is a cost effective 
way to produce oil and gas. 
Alongside this increase in oil production, RE investment and production has also 
increased in recent years, contributing 13.4% of domestically produced electricity in 2015 [1]. 
There is little reliable data on levels of subsides for RE across these countries, as what 
constitutes a subsidy can be controversial. The Financial Times used IEA data and found that 
the USA has about $15.4 billion of subsidy, whereas the UK, has about $4.1 billion. In terms 
of subsidy relative to country GDP, the UK has approaching twice the level of subsidies to the 
USA in 2013 overall. Investment has increased proportionally with this increase in renewable 
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production and has largely been supported to an extent by state and federal-level support as 
well as increased efficiency and potential returns from renewable investments.  
A feature of the USA that affects how the price of oil impacts the economy is that the 
benefit resulting from oil price increases can vary substantially from state to state depending on 
whether they are oil-importing or exporting states. Whilst overall for the USA the decrease in 
the price of oil from 2014 has been seen as broadly positive in economic terms, there are 
substantial regional differences in the effects it has, and therefore the effect the oil price will 
have on renewable investment also [32].   
3. Renewable Energy Model 
There is no specific theoretical model to explain this relationship between RE 
investment and the macroeconomy as is typical when conducting a VAR analysis, However, 
based on a standard accelerator approach to investment, output growth is an important 
determinant and according to Keynesian investment theory, investment decisions depend on 
the relationship between the marginal efficiency of capital and interest rates, producing an 
inverse relationship between investment and interest rates. In addition, for the energy sector it 
is important to incorporate the price of the main substitute in the form of oil prices, giving a 
model consisting of real oil prices (ROIL), output growth and the interest rate as factors that 
can affect renewable energy investment (REI). This choice of variables in the VAR also reflects 
the previous research in this area, such as [3], [33] [8], [11] and [34].This produces the 
following empirical relationship: 
  )INTR,RGDP,ROIL(fREI        (1) 
Furthermore with regard to the specifics of the relationships, to account for changes in 
wealth we have included real gross domestic product (RGDP), in general wealthier countries 
are more likely to invest in cleaner energy production, so we would expect a positive 
12 
 
relationship between GDP and RE production. Although investment in RE and GDP have not 
been directly analysed as yet, [35] showed that in the long-run and short-run there is a positive 
relationship between economic growth and general RE investment. Granger causality tests have 
produced mixed results regarding causality between economic growth and investment, with 
some evidence of bi-causality. They further suggested that government policies should be 
encouraged in order to enhance the expansion of the RE sector. Economic growth can cause 
investment through rising wealth increasing the ability of governments to spend on 
infrastructure, raising the marginal productivity of labour, which encourages investment. [3] 
and [6] have already found evidence of the bi-causality between economic growth and RE 
across emerging economies. The interest rate (INTR) is also included as it accounts for the 
monetary side of the economy, for instance [11] has found that variation in RE consumption is 
explained by past movements of the interest rate.  [3] and [33] identifies a significant 
relationship between the stock prices of RE based producers (which in turn influences 
investment) and interest rates. Finally, oil prices (oil) have been introduced into the model, 
reflecting its role as a substitute for RE, such that as oil prices rise, it becomes more cost 
effective to invest in and produce RE. Furthermore, oil is the main competitor of renewables in 
some specific countries ([36]).  However as mentioned this relationship will depend on whether 
the country is an oil-exporter or oil-importer among other factors. We would expect oil-
importers to have a closer relationship between RE and oil prices, as due to energy security 
factors they are more likely to feel the need to increase production of non-oil based energy, 
when oil is scarce and prices rise. Many studies indicated that an oil price increase has a positive 
impact on the RE investment in oil-importing countries ([8, 37, 11, 38, 39]). As noted earlier 
over most of the sample analysed, Norway and the UK are net oil-producers whilst the US is a 
net oil-importer, so we would expect a closer relationship between oil prices and RE investment 
in the USA. 
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3.1. Methodology  
  To assess the response of RE investment to the real oil price, real GDP and interest rate 
shocks, this study employs an unrestricted VAR model (proposed by [2]). The VAR Model 
gives a multivariate approach where changes in a particular variable are dependent on its own 
lags and the lags of other variables (see [40]). The VAR considers all variables as jointly 
endogenous and does not impose any a priori restrictions on the structural equations. 
 The VAR model is specified as tjt
p
1j
jt uzβαz  

     (2) 
where   ttttt INTRRGDPROILREIz  is a vector of  endogenous variables at 
time t,   41 α,,αα  is the (4x1) is a vector of constants, jβ  is the j
th (4x4) matrix of AR 
coefficients for j=1,2…p and   t4t1t u,,uu  is the (4x1) vector of error terms. The DREI, 
DOIL, DRGDP and INTR are the first differences of renewable energy investment (REI), real 
oil price (ROIL), Real GDP and interest rate (INTR) respectively. The form of the unrestricted 
VAR model can be specified as; 
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where  L  is the lag polynomial operator, the error term vectors are expected to be zero mean 
and uncorrelated. The dynamic response of RE to shocks in the macroeconomic variables or oil 
price can be traced using the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs). The GIRF, 
introduced by [41] and [42]), takes the traditional distribution of the residuals into account and 
computes the dynamic response to the reduced form shocks in the VAR. This approach entails 
no identification restrictions and is unaffected by the ordering of variables when computing the 
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impulse responses. The forecast error variance decomposition has also been estimated in order 
to explain the relative contribution of an individual variable to the variance of REI. 
4. Data and Results 
The date used is annual and consists of RE investment, real (inflation-adjusted) oil 
prices, real GDP, and the interest rate covering the period 1960-2015. The data has been taken 
from the International Energy Agency (IEA), International Financial Statistics (IFS), Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, OECD database Edition: May 2017. The real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) series is GDP at constant prices (Units: National Currency; Scale: Billions). The 
nominal oil price series is the petroleum average crude price (Units: USA Dollars per Barrel). 
The real oil price is computed from the nominal oil price deflated by the implicit consumer 
price index of the USA, to account for high inflation during the 1970s and 1980s. The interest 
rate is defined as the government long-term bond yield. The data was limited to annual data as 
higher frequency data for RE is not available for an extended period of time for Norway and 
the UK. The paper uses the RE generation as a proxy for RE investment, as they are highly 
related series, in that as soon as installed the RE is relatively costless to produce. The reason 
for using RE generation data rather than using installed capacity is that the data availability for 
installed capacity is only available since 1990, whereas generation figures have been available 
since 1960. Whilst there is not a perfect correlation between the two, between 1990 and 2015 
for the three countries selected correlation coefficients between generation and installed 
capacity were positive, above 0.5 and significant, especially when considering this is a truncated 
set of data compared to the dataset used, with values of 0.66, 0.91 and 0.74 for Norway, the UK 
and US respectively and all are significant at the 1% level. All the data is in logarithmic form 
(except the interest rate). 
To begin with we test for a unit root in all the variables, as a preliminary analysis, we 
apply the standard linear Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. As a 
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further test we have conducted the unit root tests of Ng and Perron [43] with a structural break. 
These tests are modified versions of the existing unit root tests, but with a better performance 
in terms of power and size distortions.  Ng and Perron introduced a set of four unit root tests, 
namely MZa, MZt MBS and MPT. The number of lags used to compute the tests has been 
chosen using the modified AIC (MAIC) proposed by [43]. Table A1 in the appendix presents 
unit root test results together with the corresponding critical values. Being in line with the other 
studies, the findings confirm that all four series are stationary in first differenced form for each 
country at the 5% significance level. The results are similar to both the conventional without 
structural breaks and with structural breaks unit root tests. 
 As all the variables are I(1), we next need to test for cointegration. We have used the 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure and Engle-Granger cointegration methods, both 
including a constant but no trend and the results are reported in the Appendix Table A2. The 
study also finds that there was no threshold (asymmetric) cointegration4. As there is no evidence 
of cointegration, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship, so we have not formed the 
VECM, instead a VAR is used, with all the variables in first-difference form, including RE, 
real GDP, real oil prices and the interest rate. furthermore, to control for the oil price shocks of 
1973-74 in all the countries and for the 2008 UK financial crisis as well as the 1990 Iraq war, 
we have employed dummy variables as exogenous variables in the VAR estimation. Table 2 
reports VAR estimation and diagnostic tests, for all countries the optimal lag selected by the 
Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria indicates 1 lag for Norway and the UK and 4 lags 
for the USA.  No root lies outside the unit circle and the VAR satisfies the stability conditions 
for all the countries. Column 4 has the values of the LM tests for autocorrelation along with the 
corresponding p-values, indicating that there is no autocorrelation in any of the models. Overall, 
there are no significant outliers left unmodelled and we consider the estimates satisfactory. 
                                                          
4 Results are available on request.  
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Given the above results, we are able to use the VAR with first-differenced data to ensure the 
variables and residuals are stationary. There is some variety across the p-values in terms of the 
Jarque-Bera test, the USA has most evidence of normality in the residual due to its greater 
macroeconomic size, relative to the UK and Norway. But as the VAR is stable this isn’t a 
problem for the estimation. 
Table 2. Summary of the VAR estimations and diagnostic tests 
Country N VAR-lag Root LM Test 
P-value 
Jarque-Bera, p-values  
   Rew Oil GDP Interest Joint 
Norway 
UK 
USA 
55 
55 
55 
1 
1 
4 
0.221 
0.155 
0.577 
0.967 
0.424 
0.760 
0.267 
0.000 
0.585 
0.000 
0.050 
0.989 
0.826 
0.002 
0.015 
0.001 
0.835 
0.917 
0.000 
0.000 
0.203 
Note: Table contains p-values for the Jarque-Bera and LM tests. The p-value represents levels of the marginal 
significance relating to a statistical hypothesis test, measuring the probability of an event occurring.  
 
Firstly, Granger causality is computed using LA-VAR Wald tests, where the lag length 
is based on the Akaike and Bayesian + 1 criteria. (see [44] ), indicating that RE is explained by 
past movements in oil prices and GDP in the USA, but interest rates do not Granger-cause RE 
(Appendix Table A3). These results partially support [14] although in that study over a different 
time period for the USA, there is no evidence of causality between oil prices and RE in the 
long-run. For Norway, the RE is influenced by the lagged GDP and lagged interest rates. Since 
interest rates are a lagging economic indicator, this result is consistent with the view that 
increased economic growth leads to higher interest rates. Neither GDP, nor oil prices have a 
Granger causal impact on RE in the UK. However, real oil prices, GDP and the interest rate 
jointly Granger-cause RE investment in Norway and the USA. This suggests that these variables 
jointly determine the RE investment and supports the conjecture that these are the relevant 
factors driving the renewable market.  
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To analyse the effects of a shock to real oil prices and its effect on RE, the GIRFs are 
used in Fig. 1. For robustness, we also computed Cholesky one standard deviation impulse 
responses in addition to the use of generalised impulse responses, the findings were similar 
using both approaches5. In the impulse response functions, the dashed lines show a one standard 
error 95% confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response 
functions. For Norway and the USA, the structural shocks to oil prices have a significantly 
positive effect on RE, whereas in the UK the effect is not significant. The oil price shocks have, 
as expected, a positive and highly significant effect on RE in the oil-importing country, the 
USA, where RE investment increases by about 3% after the one standard deviation shock. This 
is consistent with the findings, reported by [11], [45], [46] and [47], who find that there is a 
significant impact of oil prices on RE. For Norway there is a significant and positive 
relationship between oil prices and RE, reflecting the market orientated approach to the sector 
in Norway. However, the oil price shocks have a negative and negligible effect on RE in the 
UK, the effect is very small and became zero after 3 lags. This may be because the UK has been 
an oil-exporter for most of the period studied and oil price shocks have had little effect on 
investment in the renewable sector. Furthermore, this could be due to greater intervention in 
the UK market in the form of subsidies by the authorities as noted in section two earlier. Due 
to the lack of any significant effect in the UK, we further computed a non-linear VAR for the 
UK to analyse the asymmetric effect of oil prices on RE investment, by using the approach of 
[48], Mork defines positive and negative annual OP innovations as  tROIL and 
 tROIL
respectively, in the following ways; 
  1ttt ROILROIL,0maxROIL 
        (4) 
                                                          
5 Results are available on request. 
18 
 
  1ttt ROILROIL,0minROIL 
        (5)  
The findings of the non-linear model parallel the linear model regarding the negligibility 
and insignificant impact of oil price shocks on RE. However, the magnitude of the response is 
higher in the non-linear model as compared to the linear model, the results are reported in 
Appendix Fig. A1.These results indicate that there are no symmetric or asymmetric effects from 
oil price shocks on the UK’s RE investment. In addition to the high levels of support for RE in 
the UK, a further possible explanation for these results is as follows. As suggested by [49] the 
primary objective of the UK energy policy is to ensure a reliable supply to the residential market 
to prevent fuel poverty, to reduce carbon emissions and to increase revenue, so the UK RE 
sector is not as sensitive to oil prices. Therefore, when the oil price increases and decreases, it 
has had little direct impact on the UK renewable energy sector due to the extensive financial 
support available to those wishing to invest in the renewable energy sector during the period 
analysed. 
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Fig. 1. Renewable energy response to real oil price shocks. 
Output (productivity) shocks have positive effects on RE, which causes an increase in 
RE investment in all countries except the UK as reported in Fig. 2. This parallels the findings 
of [5], [6] and that economic growth has a positive and statistically significant impact on RE. 
However, the response of RE to output shocks is insignificant in the UK and USA. For Norway, 
the response of RE to a real GDP shock is significantly positive and permanent reflecting that 
it is more market orientated in this country. 
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Fig. 2. Renewable energy response to GDP shocks. 
 
Fig. 3 shows that the monetary shocks have an insignificant effect on RE in all countries. 
The finding is consistent with [11] as they find a negligible response of RE to an interest rate 
shock.  
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Fig. 3. Renewable energy response to interest rate shocks. 
 We further do some robustness checks on these baseline results. We use nominal oil 
prices instead of real oil prices in eq. (3) as suggested by [50, 51] and [10]. For simplicity, we 
only report the results corresponding to RE investment to oil price shocks, which are reported 
in Fig. 4. We find that the empirical results are almost identical to the corresponding baseline 
results with nominal prices.  
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Fig. 4. Renewable energy response to nominal oil price shocks. 
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 The forecast error variance decomposition is used to measure the proportion of 
variations in RE investment caused by oil prices, output and interest rate shocks respectively. 
The results are slightly different to the IRFs, as oil prices tend to only explain a small amount 
of the RE variance, with the exception of the USA. In this case after 12 time periods, 22% of 
the variance is explained by oil prices, as reported in Table 5. In Norway it is approximately 
4% and for the UK only about 3%, see Table 3 and 4. For the latter countries, it is the RE that 
explains most of the RE variance, where the forecast error variance of RE to its own shocks are 
about 88% in Norway and 97% in the UK. Output shocks contribute about 4%, 0.5% and 14% 
of the changes in RE in Norway, UK and USA respectively. In contrast impulse response, 
productivity shocks forecast a substantial amount of the variance of the RE in the USA. 
Monetary (interest rate) shocks contribute 13% of the changes in RE in USA in the long-run. 
This suggests that only in the USA is there a substantial relationship between RE and oil prices, 
reflecting the different nature of the USA RE market, which is more market orientated than in 
other countries, with fewer policies encouraging RE through the tax and subsidy systems. In 
the UK during the time period investigated, the RE market is subject to more interference by 
government, with higher levels of subsidy and use of environmental taxes.  Norway appears to 
lie between these two extremes, reflecting the lesser need for the authorities to intervene in the 
market, as Norway’s hydro-electric industry operates in a market environment and doesn’t 
require high levels of subsidies. Overall according to the variance decomposition analysis the 
strongest response is in the USA, with approximately 22% being explained by the oil price, 
Norway has a moderate response whereas in the UK it is the poorest. 
Table 3. Forecast error variance decompositions of renewable energy Norway. 
Horizon    Renewable           Oil Price    Output  Interest Rate 
 1  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 2  91.27  1.57  2.43  4.71 
 3  87.91  3.53  3.67  4.87 
 4  87.68 3.54  3.85 4.91 
21 
 
 5  87.62 3.54  3.89  4.92 
 6  87.63 3.54  3.90  4.93 
 7  87.62 3.54  3.90  4.93 
 8  87.62 3.54  3.90  4.93 
 9  87.62 3.54 3.90  4.93 
 10  87.62 3.54 3.90  4.93 
 11  87.62  3.54 3.90  4.93 
 12  87.62  3.54 3.90  4.93 
 
Table 4. Forecast error variance decompositions of renewable energy UK. 
Horizon    Renewable           Oil Price    Output  Interest Rate 
 1  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 2 96.82  2.67  0.42  0.09 
 3  96.74 2.67 0.42  0.17 
 4  96.70 2.67 0.44  0.18 
 5 96.70  2.68 0.44  0.18 
 6 96.70  2.68 0.44 0.18 
 7 96.70  2.68 0.44 0.18 
 8 96.70  2.68 0.44 0.18 
 9 96.70  2.68 0.44 0.18 
 10 96.70  2.68 0.44 0.18 
 11 96.70  2.68 0.44  0.18 
 12 96.70  2.68  0.44 0.18 
 
Table 5. Forecast error variance decompositions of renewable energy USA. 
Horizon    Renewable           Oil Price    Output  Interest Rate 
 1 84.85 15.15  0.00  0.00 
 2 83.88 15.22  0.27  0.61 
 3  71.65 15.74 6.58 6.02 
 4  67.22 15.45  11.34  5.98 
 5  58.82 21.09 14.47 5.61 
 6  54.17 22.41  13.54 9.87 
 7 52.70 22.65  13.73  10.91 
 8  52.66 22.68 13.70  10.95 
 9 52.43 22.66  13.79  11.11   
 10  51.61 22.28  13.51 12.59  
 11  51.34 22.19  13.74 12.72 
 12 51.14 22.37  13.73  12.76 
5. Discussion and policy analysis 
5.1. Discussion 
This study has shown the importance of considering the movements in oil prices when 
developing policies to encourage greater use of RE markets. This is particularly important given 
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the recent volatility in the oil markets. In particular, it emphasises the need to consider these 
policies on a country by country basis, with regard for whether the country imports or exports 
oil and the financial support available for the renewable sector. As [36] has indicated one of the 
key variables for encouraging investment into the RE market is ensuring there is a sufficient 
market based return from the investment, whilst accounting for any financial support a specific 
country may be providing to the sector. As they note this tends to depend on the main 
competitors to RE which tends to be oil. So the return is highly sensitive to movements in oil 
prices in those economies where the RE sector is more market orientated. However, in countries 
where there is more intervention in the renewable sector, this return is less sensitive to oil 
market volatility. This suggests that future investment in the renewable sector needs to consider 
not only the local market for energy but also potential movements in oil prices when deciding 
on whether to invest or not. 
5.2. Policy implications  
These results from the VAR analysis show just how important government policy has been in 
mapping the course of renewable investment, especially for the UK, although of less importance 
in the USA. This was a common theme in the literature but was often assumed rather than 
quantitatively suggested. It also seems that traditional determinants of investment in general, 
such as GDP growth, can only go part of the way towards explaining renewable investment, 
there must be other determinants that can better explain changes in renewable investment, i.e. 
government intervention. Recently government spending in renewables has fallen, and with 
costs of renewables now a fraction of what they were in the past, in future the VAR model 
should be able to better show which macroeconomic factors determine RE investment.  
There are a number of important policy implications resulting from this study, with regard 
to energy policies which aim to reduce carbon emissions whilst encouraging the RE sector to 
become more market orientated. As noted, the evidence suggests the RE markets are 
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fundamentally different across countries, depending on whether the country is a net-exporter or 
importer of oil, the approach of the authorities to supporting RE, the extent to which the 
geography of a country supports RE as in Norway and the wealth of a country. Where a country 
has a more market orientated energy sector as well as being a net-importer of oil, as in the USA, 
the RE industry has a strong relationship with the oil market. However, in countries such as the 
UK, where until recently there was a comprehensive policy framework of support for the 
renewable sector, investment and therefore production of energy from renewables will be less 
sensitive to movements in the oil market. Given recent volatility in the oil market and recent 
falls in support for RE, it could be worthwhile designing policies that take into account the need 
to smooth investment and production in the renewable sector throughout the oil cycle, in the 
future. 
In general, a more counter-cyclical approach might be required regarding energy policies, 
which are associated with the price of oil. The recent sharp decline in the price of oil has caused 
the potential for disruption in investment in renewables, to the extent that they could decline 
and become insufficiently profitable. With respect to oil prices, there is now an opportunity for 
policy makers in countries that subsidies the price of oil to decrease subsidies on oil prices, 
when the price falls so as to ensure renewable energy remains profitable. For countries where 
such large subsidies don’t exist, policy makers could raise taxes on oil prices. This would 
minimise the oil price fall’s negative effects on RE investment. Hence when the oil price 
declines then either taxes could rise or subsidies could be decreased. Any increase in tax 
revenue or fall in public spending could be utilised to subsidise renewables, and/or develop 
them and also offer support for poor consumers adversely affected by those changes. In contrast, 
when the oil price increases, taxes on them could be lowered. In particular, for the USA and 
Norway, where RE is more sensitive to oil price changes, these policies could be considered, 
especially during the current rea of relatively low oil prices.  
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A further policy implication of this study relates to the hedging role of renewable energy, 
as initially discussed by [52] This study suggests that the policy mix in terms of RE and NRE, 
could provide a useful hedge against the negative effects stemming from volatility and 
unpredictability in the oil price. This study indicates that if fossil fuels are the only sector of the 
market that is exposed to volatility in the commodity markets, then increasing the proportion 
of renewable energy in the mix will reduce the overall volatility of the portfolio of energy 
sources volatility. This study supports this proposition but emphasises that this policy would 
only work in some countries where the relationship between renewable energy and oil markets 
is minimal. 
5.3. Future research and limitations 
Future research needs to take into account that the world of RE has changed over the 
past few years, with reductions in the levels of financial support and this trend will continue in 
the future, so future economic analysis surrounding it will need to reflect these changes, 
including the impact of increased demands for cleaner fuels and a less polluted environment. 
In addition, future research will need to take into account some of the negative externalities 
associated with RE, such as the impact on the environment of increased use of biomass. This 
study has taken advantage of the recent availability of sufficient data to conduct a time series 
analysis, however as is common with this type of study it would have benefited from a longer 
time series. 
6. Conclusions  
This paper has analysed the interrelationship between RE investment and oil prices along with 
the main macroeconomic factors, providing a quantitative analysis of a topic hitherto mainly 
qualitatively discussed. Granger causality tests indicate that movements in oil prices, GDP, and 
interest rates each have a relatively strong power in explaining the movements of the RE sector, 
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except in the UK where the impact is poor. The results show oil prices have a significant impact 
on the RE sector in Norway and particularly strongly in the USA. The results also suggest that 
GDP and interest rate shocks have moderately positive and significant effects on RE investment 
in Norway. For Norway the impulse responses are moderate, showing that it lies between the 
USA and UK, which has poor effects, in that there are significant effects from oil prices and 
GDP on the renewable sector, although the effect is not so strong based on the variance 
decompositions. The variance decomposition shows the oil price explained a significant part, 
approximately 22% of the variance of RE investment in the USA. In contrast to the impulse 
responses, GDP growth and interest rates explained a substantial part of the forecast error 
variance of RE in USA showing that RE investment is sensitive in these countries to the costs 
of borrowing. Overall these results support those of some previous studies such as [20] that 
found the relationship between the renewable energy sector and the macroeconomy, including 
non-renewable energy markets, varies substantially across countries and is therefore better 
modelled on an individual country basis. 
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Appendix 
a. Positive change in OP    b. Negative change in OP 
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Fig. A. Asymmetric response of renewable energy to real oil price (OP) shock for UK. 
Table A1. Unit root test results. 
Variables  ADF PP 𝑀𝑍𝛼
𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑀𝑍𝑡
𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝐵𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑀𝑃𝑇
𝐺𝐿𝑆 
 Norway 
Renewable Level 
1st difference 
-2.94 
-6.38* 
-2.62 
-14.52* 
-1.76 
-20.13* 
-0.77 
-3.16* 
0.44 
0.16* 
39.43 
4.56* 
Real Oil Price Level 
1st difference 
-1.89 
-7.18* 
-1.99 
-7.17* 
-6.66 
-26.86* 
-1.79 
-3.45* 
0.27 
0.13 
13.70 
1.57* 
Real GDP Level 
1st difference 
-0.27 
-4.53* 
-0.22 
-4.87* 
-2.07 
-26.98* 
-0.71 
-3.67* 
0.34 
0.14* 
28.48 
3.39* 
Interest Rate Level 
1st difference 
-0.89 
-5.62* 
-0.97 
-5.60* 
-1.10 
-26.15* 
-0.56 
-3.61* 
0.51 
0.14* 
54.23 
3.51* 
 UK 
Renewable Level 
1st difference 
-1.38 
-8.44* 
-1.20 
-8.68* 
-2.37 
-26.74* 
-0.90 
-3.65* 
0.38 
0.14* 
30.86 
3.41* 
Real Oil Price Level 
1st difference 
-1.89 
-7.18* 
-1.99 
-7.17* 
-6.66 
-26.86* 
-1.79 
-3.45* 
0.28 
0.13* 
13.70 
1.57* 
Real GDP Level 
1st difference 
-0.46 
-5.24* 
-0.50 
-4.94* 
-0.46 
-24.54* 
-0.18 
-3.50* 
0.39 
0.14* 
39.73 
3.72* 
Interest Rate Level 
1st difference 
-1.71 
-5.92* 
-1.60 
-7.52* 
-2.01 
-26.06* 
-0.89 
-3.61* 
0.54 
014* 
38.75 
3.49* 
 USA 
Renewable Level 
1st difference 
-152 
-7.33* 
-1.61 
-7.37* 
-3.59 
-26.92* 
-1.34 
-3.65* 
0.37 
0.14* 
25.38 
3.51* 
Real Oil Price Level 
1st difference 
-1.89 
-7.18* 
-1.99 
-7.17* 
-6.66 
-26.86* 
-1.79 
-3.45* 
0.27 
0.13* 
13.70 
1.57* 
Real GDP Level 
1st difference 
-2.30 
-5.66 
-1.52 
-5.48 
-6.35 
-24.83 
-1.54 
-3.52 
0.24 
0.14 
14.32 
3.68* 
Interest Rate Level 
1st difference 
1.49 
-6.43* 
-1.55 
-6.43* 
-2.47 
-26.50* 
-1.00 
-3.64* 
0.41 
0.14* 
32.63 
3.44* 
Model with constant and linear trend: critical values  
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 ADF PP 𝑀𝑍𝛼
𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑀𝑍𝑡
𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝐵𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑀𝑃𝑇
𝐺𝐿𝑆 
1% -4.13 -4.13 -23.80 -3.42  0.14  4.03 
5% -3.49 
 
-3.49 
 
-17.30 -2.91 0.16  5.48 
10% -3.18 -3.18 -14.20 -2.62 0.18 6.67 
Note: * indicate the level of significance at the 5%. 
Table A2. Cointegration tests results. 
Hypothesised 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace Test Maximum Eigenvalues Engle-Granger Test 
 Statistics Critical 
Values 5% 
Statistics Critical 
Values 5% 
Statistics Critical 
Values 
5% 
Norway 
None 44.80 47.86 21.09 27.58 -2.06 4.22 
At most 1 23.70 29.80 12.37 21.13 NA  
UK 
None 33.29 47.86 15.83 27.58 -2.05 4.22 
At most 1 17.46 29.80 11.68 21.13 NA  
USA 
None 44.06 47.86 24.02 27.58 -2.27 4.22 
At most 1 20.04 29.80 12.20 21.13 NA  
 
Table A3.  Granger causality/block exogeneity Wald tests based on a VAR model.  
1: Norway 
Null Hypothesis Chi-square  lag Prob.  
∆OIL does not Granger cause ∆REW 
∆GDP does not Granger cause ∆REW 
∆INTR does not Granger cause ∆REW  
All ∆OIL, ∆GDP and ∆INTR does not Granger cause 
renewable energy 
1.82 
2.39 
3.20 
7.84 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0.18 
0.12 
0.07 
0.04 
2: UK 
∆OIL does not Granger cause ∆REW 
∆GDP does not Granger cause ∆REW 
∆INTR does not Granger cause ∆REW  
1.13 
0.38 
0.06 
2 
2 
2 
0.28 
0.53 
0.80 
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All ∆OIL, ∆GDP and ∆INTR does not Granger cause 
renewable energy 
1.63 2 0.65 
3: USA 
∆OIL does not Granger cause ∆REW 
∆GDP does not Granger cause ∆REW 
∆INTR does not Granger cause ∆REW  
All ∆OIL, ∆GDP and ∆INTR does not Granger cause 
renewable energy 
8.07 
13.26 
7.33 
23.94 
5 
5 
5 
5 
0.04 
0.01 
0.11 
0.00 
 
 
